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THE MANHATTAN'S ARCTIC CONQUEST AND
CANADA'S RESPONSE IN LEGAL DIPLOMACY
Raymond W. Konan
I. THE CONQUEST AND ITS CHALLENGE

On the night of September 14, 1969, the huge American tanker, SS
Manhattan,' broke loose from the Arctic ice pack to become the first
3
commercial ship 2 to conquer the Northwest Passage. The Manhattan
had proven that it is technologically possible for properly designed, icebreaking super-tankers to navigate the frozen waters between the islands
of Canada's Arctic archipelago. In order to further establish the yearround feasibility of the route for transporting Alaskan oil to the northeast coast of the United States, the Manhattan is making a second voyage
through the Northwest Passage this spring.
It is not surprising that many in Canada viewed the Manhattan'ssuccess with serious misgivings and profound concern. Some felt that
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic had been effectively challenged by the
4
Manhattan's conquest. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is reported to
have made no response when a reporter suggested that the Manhattan's
voyage would soon be followed by others that would establish an international legal precedent before Canada's claims in the area could be
5
effectively asserted. It was feared by some that the first voyage had
already transformed the "Canadian" Arctic waters into an international

1. The Manhattan is owned by the Humble Oil and Refining Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, but is operated on experimental Arctic voyages
by a consortium of oil companies.
2. Earlier, but non-commercial, conquests of the Northwest Passage include the
following: the 1906 crossing from the Atlantic to the Pacific by Roald Amundsen of
Norway in the Gjoa, a forty-seven ton herring boat; the 1940-42 passage from Pacific
to Atlantic by the Canadian schooner St. Roch; the 1944 return voyage of the St.
Roch; the 1953 Pacific to Atlantic crossing of a squadron of United States Coast Guard
icebreakers, the Spar, Bramble, and Storis; and the 1960 underwater crossing by the
American nuclear submarine USS Seadragon. For a fuller account of the development
Passage as a route for water transit, see Pharand, Innocent Passage
of the Northwest
9
in the Arctic, [1 68] 6 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 42-47.
3. The Northwest Passage refers to the sea route (or routes) between the North
Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean through the Canadian Arctic archipelago. The most
direct Northwest Passage route is the one taken by the Manhattan on its first crossing.
It commences at Lancaster Sound in the east, runs west through the Barrow Strait and
Viscount Melville Sound, then runs southwest through the Prince of Wales Strait
between Banks and Victoria Islands into the Beaufort Sea in the southeastern part
of the Arctic Ocean. For a discussion of other routes and a description of conditions
in the Parry Channel, see Pharand, supra note 2, at 48-51
4. See, e.g., comments of Member of Parliament, T.C. Douglas, 114 House of Commons Debates, No. 50, 2nd Sess., 28th Parl., at 2694 (January 22, 1970).
5. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 12, 1969, at 1, col. 7.
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sea route or an international strait.8 There was considerable doubt as to
what Canada's rights were in the Passage; it was not generally known
exactly what Canada had formally claimed in the past. National pride,7
the fear of losing something that was Canada's,8 conservationist sentiments, 9 and concern for national security 10 were all stimulated by the
Manhattan's conquest. In acknowledgment of the conquest and considering its possible implications, the Canadian government appears to
have embarked upon a deliberate campaign to bolster Canada's traditional claims in the area and to win support for some untraditional
Canadian proposals to protect Canadian interests in the Arctic. Canada's
response may well be viewed and analyzed as a purposeful exercise of
"legal diplomacy."'"

II. LEGAL DIPLOMACY: THE MEDIUM FOR CANADA'S RESPONSE

A.

LEGAL DIPLOMACY IN POLITICAL CONTEXT

Legal diplomacy may be defined narrowly as the use by states of
claims and assertions based on existing principles and new proposals of
international law.' 2 It may be defined more broadly to include also the
execution of strategies designed to affect the legal rights and obligations
of states. The latter definition would include such measures as the calling
for an international conference, voting strategies to maximize bloc effectiveness at such a conference or at the United Nations, the decision to
accept or not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, and
domestic legislation to extend state jurisdiction into disputed areas of
state authority. Because it is an aspect of overall state diplomacy,' 3 legal

6. Traditional practice has been to recognize a right of innocent passage (at least
for merchant vessels) through waterways forming channels of navigation between parts
of the high seas, even if the channels are within the territorial waters of the coastal
state. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 516 (1962).
7. See comments of Paul Yewchuk, Debates, supra note 4, at 2681.

8. See comments of T. C. Douglas, Debates, note 4 supra.
9. Supra note 4, at 2684.
10. See comments of Paul St. Perre, Debates, supra note 4, at 2689.
11. The term is defined and explained in the following section of this note. For a
discussion of United States and Soviet "legal diplomacy" in the context of regional

lawmaking, see note by this writer, The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Precedents in
American Legal Diplomacy for the Socialist States' Claim of Right, 2 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 143 (1969>.
12. Supra note 11, at 144, n. 6.
13. "Diplomacy," as used in this note, is broadly considered to include all steps
short of war which states may engage in to communicate their interests and to encourage other states and international bodies to act in accord with them.
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diplomacy by either definition is properly seen in the context of international politics. The following propositional sequence' 4 may illustrate
the relationship of legal diplomacy to its political context:
(1) States, like other political and social units, have interests which
they seek to achieve, protect, or expand. 15
(2) The international relations of states are dominated, or at least
thoroughly permeated, by a complex interplay and competition
of national interests. 16
(3) Diplomacy, broadly conceived, is the predominant method states
7
employ to realize their interests in the international system.'
8
(4) While many types of diplomacy are employed,' legal diplomacy,
or the use of claims and assertions based on principles and proposals of international law, and the execution of strategies to
affect the state's legal position, is prominent in the current practice of states.
Having thus placed legal diplomacy in the context of interstate practice generally, the concept may now be more adequately defined and
compared with the concept of international law.
B.

LEGAL DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Legal diplomacy, defined as the use of claims and assertions based on
pre-existing and newly proposed principles of internationl law, need
not be confused with international law itself. While international
law may be viewed as a system of international rights and duties, however dynamic or progressively developing, legal diplomacy should be
regarded as legal advocacy. Legal diplomacy need not be conceptually
confused with international law any more than an attorney's advocacy
need be confused with domestic law. Both states in their legal diplomacy
and attorneys in their courtroom advocacy advance principles and proposals of law which an impartial judge would have to rule as specious,
14. The propositional sequence was partially inspired by the functional approach
described by R. K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCruRE, ch. 1 (1957) and

Cancian, Varieties of Functional Analysis, in

INTERNATIONAL

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE

29 (1968).
15. Such state interests include increases "in power, in prosperity, in security, in
prestige (sometimes substituting for power), and in reputation (useful in attracting
allies) ." Q. WRIGHT, THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELXATIONS 577 (1955).
16. Reinhold Niebuhr has made the categorical, but little disputed statement that,
"[t]he selfishness of nations were not to be trusted beyond their own interest. 'No
state,' declares a German author, 'has ever entered a treaty for any other means than
self interest,' and adds, 'A stateman who has any other motive would deserve to be
hung.'" R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, xi-xii (1932>.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. E.g., friendly persuasion, commercial bargaining, formal protest, break of diplomatic relations, trade boycott.
SOCIAL SCiRNcEs
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invalid, or at least not preferred. Nevertheless, legal diplomacy serves
some of the functions which the international legal system itself is meant
to serve. These functions include the articulation of interests, the facilitation of the aggregation of interests into general consensus, the legitimation of state claims, and the formulation of new legal rules. 19
The states of the international community will be considering the legal
content and the persuasive quality of the legal diplomacy Canada employs in support of her claims in deciding upon the worth of Canada's
claims, and their own interests in having Canada succeed with them. Although this legal diplomacy and its bases in existing and proposed
principles of law have not been fully articulated, some claims have been
made and some domestic legislation has been proposed to effectuate
Canada's claimed jurisdiction over the waters of the Arctic archipelago.

III. CANADA'S RESPONSE IN LEGAL DIPLOMACY
A. "ICE AS LAND" - RuLE FORMULATION

Four days after the Manhattan had conquered the frozen Northwest
Passage, but before it had arrived at its Alaskan destination, Canadian
Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, writing on the topic, A
Ship and Sovereignty in the North, declared that, "from a practical point
of view, ice is more like land than water in certain parts of the world
such as the Canadian Arctic." 20 A week later, on September 26, 1969,
Prime Minister Trudeau announced that Canada would attempt to persuade the international community to accept the ice pack of the Northwest Passage as land for the purpose of establishing Canadian sovereignty
21
in the area.
External Affairs Minister Sharp openly recognized the important
role of legal diplomacy in international law-making and announced
,Canada's commitment to a course of rule formulation or modification
when he stated:
Because international law is in a continual state of modification, it is
19. Still other functions which legal diplomacy would seem to share with the international legal system are conflict resolution (in the attempt to use legal argument
and developing or proposed principles of law in the settlement of disputes) and order
promotion (the use of law and legal argument for the purpose of restraining interstate hostilities and stabilizing relations through advocacy of orderly procedures for
change). The studied scholar or imaginative student may be able to think of still
other examples.
20. Sharp, A Ship and Sovereignty in the North, The Globe and Mail, Sept. 18, 1969,
at 7, col. 3.
21. The Globe and Mail, Sept. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 1.

1970/The Manhattan and Canada'sLegal Diplomacy

not only open to states but, indeed, it is incumbent upon them to contribute to its progressive development. Canada has not hesitated to do
this ....
With respect to the law concerning frozen waters, what state has a
better claim than Canada to contribute to the development of international law?
The general principles of international law may have to be applied
in a special way in the case of frozen waters, just as special rules are
required with respect to the seabed and outer space, the two other environments
comparable in the sense that the law is not yet fully de22
veloped.
It would appear, however, that in taking the view that a new rule of
international law might be introduced to provide the basis for Canadian
claims of sovereignty over the frozen Arctic waters of the Canadian
archipelago, Canada underestimated the fundamental nature of interstate
diplomacy as an interplay of national interests. The recent modifications in the customary laws of the sea to provide for the new principles
23
of (1) national rights in the continental shelf beneath the high seas,
(2) exclusive national fishing rights in contiguous zones beyond the territorial sea,2 4 and (3) coastal state rights to draw twenty-four mile baselines from headland to headland 25 may only have been possible because
a great number of states believed their intersts were being advanced. In
each case, coastal state jurisdiction was extended outward from national
shorelines. Most inland states responded passively because they had developed no dependence on the sea and had no coastal interests of their
own to advance. Nearly all coastal states appeared willing to have the
because they felt they
world community's interest in the whole reduced
26
could achieve an immediate, tangible gain.
Such a coincidence of interests is not likely to develop on the "ice as
land" principle. 27 The only states which would gain from the new principle are Canada, Norway, and the Soviet Union, and perhaps, to a much

22. Supra note 20, at cols. 4-5.
23. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
[1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.IA.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964),
art. 2.
24. The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599
U.N.T.S. 285 (effective March 20, 1966), art. 7.
25. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva,
April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective
Sept. 10, 1964), art. 4.
26. See Freeman, Law of the Continental Shelf and Ocean Resources - An Overview,
in this issue, 105, 116-19, for a discussion of voting patterns on the Continental Shelf
Convention.
27. For an earlier discussion of the merits and problems in the "ice as land" principle, see Head, Canadian Claims to TerritorialSovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9
McGiLL L. J. 200, 220-24 (1963>.
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more limited extent, Denmark and the United States. 28 All, or nearly all,
other states would lose the "world community" rights they may feel they
now possess, such as free passage in international waters, fishing rights,
and perhaps even seabed exploitation.
Exclusive Canadian rights of seabed exploitation in the shallow, singleshelf submarine floor of the archipelago may already have been recognized by the Continental Shelf Convention and there are few states with
any appreciable fishing interests in the waters of the Arctic archipelago.
It is concern for the international character of the Passage as a high seas
shipping and naval route which appears to be most centrally at issue.
To lessen such protective concern, the Canadian government declared
that it will not seek to limit the right of free passage for all ships through
29
the Northwest Passage.
Perhaps in part to give other states an interest in having Canada control the waters of the Arctic archipelago, the Canadian government declared its commitment to protect the delicate ecological balance of the
far North.30 Pollution control gives 'Canada an identifiable interest in
the Arctic which other states might be willing to accept. The danger of
pollution, however, is connected to the prospects of increased navigation
in the Passage - a fact which goes directly against the argument that the
31
ice of the Passage should be regarded as land.
The community of states is not likely to adopt a new principle of law
to accommodate Canadian claims to Arctic sovereignty at the expense
of community interests if the Canadian claims do not have a firm basis
in existing law. The novel "ice as land" principle is not essential to
Canadian supervision of pollution measures. Such authority could be
given via an international agreement or convention without prejudicing
the alleged international character of the waterway.
Apparently Canada's leaders have come to recognize the lack of general
interest in the "ice as land" formulation and have not carried out their
announced campaign to sell it to the world as a desirable new principle
of law. Canadian legal diplomacy would appear to have greater prospects
of success if, instead of proposing a new formulation of law, it were to

28. United States President Richard Nixon, however, has indicated in a statement
to Congress on February 18, 1970, that the United States has more interest in having
the Arctic's frozen waters regarded as high seas than in having them regarded as land
subject to territorial sovereignty. N.Y. Tmes, February 19, 1970, at 1, col. 8.
29. Supra note 20, at col. 6.
30. Speech from the Throne (prepared by Prime Minister Trudeau), 114 House of
Commons Debates, No. 1, 1st Sess., 28th Par., at 1 (Oct. 23, 1969).
31. That is, pollution is a danger precisely because the Northwest Passage may be
used as a regular transportation route for transport vessels, particularly oil-carrying
supertankers. This fact would seem contradictory to the assertion that the frozen
waters should be regarded as land.
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rely on the doctrine of "historic right"32 to win exemption from the requirements of contemporary standards of international law. There is
considerable history upon which a Canadian claim of "historic right"
might be based.
B.

LEGITIMATION VIA "HISTORIC RIGHT"

1. The Fisheries Case Precedent
Canada may be able to legitimate33 its claim of sovereignty over the
waters between the islands of her Arctic archipelago by making a persuasive case of "historic right." The International Court of Justice in
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case 34 upheld the doctrine of historic
right declaring that historical practice and general acceptance by other
states can be valid grounds for the recognition of rights which need not
conform to current standards of international law. The Court spelled out
what it regarded as the basis for recognizing Norway's historic right of
sovereign jurisdiction over the waters of its coastal archipelago in the
following terms:
Norway has been in a position to argue without any contradiction that
neither the promulgation of her delimitation Decrees in 1869 and in
1889, nor their application, gave rise to any opposition on the part of
foreign States. Since, moreover, these Decrees constitute, as has been
shown above, the application of a well-defined and uniform system,
it is indeed this system itself which would reap the benefit of general
consolidation which would make it
toleration, the basis of an historic
35
enforceable as against all States.
The Fisheries decision legitimated Norway's claim that the waters between the Norwegian coastline and its coastal archipelago 36 were internal
waters on the ground that Norway had exercised the necessary jurisdiction over them for a long period without opposition from other states in
a kind of possessio longi temporis.3 7 The result was that Norway's jurisdiction over the said waters must now be recognized by all states, even
though the exercise of such jurisdiction over them would derogate from
contemporary principles regulating the internal waters of the archipelago.

32. The doctrine of "historic right" is discussed in § III, B, 1, infra.
33. The concept of "legitimation" refers generally to acceptance as valid; legitimacy
may be based on some form of judicial or arbitral opinion, or upon general community acceptance without any such proceeding.
34. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.
35. Id. at 138.
36. The geography of the Norwegian archipelago and coastline is discussed in the
Fisheries Case opinion, supra note 34, at 127, 134, 141.
37. Id. at 130.
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The Norwegian claim was3sexempted from current law by virtue of
Norwegian "historic right."
Specifically, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries decision legitimated Norwegian baselines of 45 miles in length around the outer perimeter of the
coastal island group to enclose the waters within them as internal waters.
At the widest points of land separation, baselines enclosing the waters
within the Canadian archipelago which comprise the Northwest Passage
would be 50 miles across the entrance of Lancaster Sound in the east and
100 miles across the M'Clure Strait in the west. Professor Pharand has
asserted that such lines would be contrary to international law,39 presumably because their length exceeds permissible limits under the 1958
Convention of the Territorial Sea. 40 If, however, Canada could succeed
in asserting its claim as an "historic right," current law on the maximum
length of baselines would not apply.41 The World Court specified no
maximum length limitations in the Fisheries case. There is no language
in the opinion which indicates that the Court regarded the 45 mile baselines it authorized as the maximum length permissible under "historic
right."
Therefore, it need only be determined if Canada can meet the tests
applied, and
of the Fisheries case: 1) a well-defined claim, 2) consistently
42
3) general toleration by states without opposition.
2. Canada'sCase for Historic Right
Canada's claims of sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic
archipelago may be traced back to the 1904 publication of a map of
Canadian territories prepared by the Department of the Interior. 43 That
map may also have been the first embodiment in a public document of
the "sector theory." 44 It portrayed 'Canada's boundaries as extending
along the 141st and the 60th meridians of west longitude northward to
the Pole. It is of considerable significance that all subsequent Canadian
maps have shown these same national boundaries. Publication of the
maps, however, was not accompanied by any more explicit claims of
sovereignty over the sector which includes land, water, and ice.
38. Id. at 139.
39. Pharand, supra note 2, at 58.
40. Id. at 58-60.
41. Supra note 34, at 131.
42. Additional considerations of the Court were 1) "the close dependence of the
sea upon the land domain" in the concern of "local needs and practical requirements",
2) "the more or less close relationship existing between certain sea areas and the land
formations", and 3> "economic interests peculiar to a region evidenced by a long
useage". Supra note 34, at 133. Canada's legal position is discussed in light of these
considerations by Head, supra note 27, at 219-20.
43. Pharand, supra note 2, at 51.
44. For a discussion of the "sector theory" in Canadian context, see Head, supra
note 27, at 202-10.
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A direct claim was made in 1925 when the Canadian Minister of the
Interior, Charles Stewart, stated that a government bill introduced to
amend the Northwest Territories Act was specificially designed to assert
Canada's "ownership over the whole northern archipelago." 45 When
asked if Canada's territory extended to the North Pole, the Minister rea week
plied, "Yes, right up to the North Pole."' 46 This claim, reiterated
48
47
later by the same Minister, appears to have gone uncontested.
Some twenty years later, in 1946, Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian
Ambassador to the United States declared that:
A large part of the world's total Arctic area is Canadian. One should
know exactly what this part comprises. It includes not only -Canada's
northland, but the islands and the frozen sea north of the mainland
and west boundaries, extended to the
between the meridians of its east
49
North Pole. (emphasis added)
The claim was again made in 1953 when Prime Minister St. Laurent introduced a bill creating the Department of Northern Affairs. He emphatically declared, "We must leave no doubt about our active occupation and exercise of our sovereignty in these northern lands right up to
the Pole." 50 The new department was to be "symbolic of the actuality
of the exercise of Canadian sovereignty over them." 51 The Prime
Minister's appointed head of the new department, Jean Lesage, however,
did not follow the direction of the Prime Minister, for on one occasion
in 1956, Mr. Lesage made a statement in the House of Commons to the
effect that Canada had "never subscribed to the sector theory in application to the ice ....The sea, be it frozen or in its natural state, is the sea;
and our sovereignty exists over the lands and over our territorial
52
waters."
Although this statement appeared aberrant from Canadian policy as
evidenced by the above noted statements of 1925, 1946, and 1953, as well
53
as from all Canadian maps of the area since 1904, Professor Pharand
of the University of Ottawa has attached great weight to it. Professor
Pharand has even suggested that the Lesage statement "more accurately
formulated" Canada's claims and was "the best official evidence avail45. [1925] 4 Parliamentary Debates, at 3772 (June 1, 1925).
46. Id. at 3773.
47. Id., at 4069 (June 10, 1925).
48. Head, supra note 27, at 216. Cited are a 1959 report to the House of Commons
by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the effect that there were no disputes
with either the United States or the Soviet Union since 1900 "concerning the ownership of any portion of the Canadian Arctic" and a 1957 government report on U.S.
compliance with the Canadian Shipping Act.
49. Pearson, Canada Looks 'Down North, 1946 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 638-39.
50. [1953-54] 1 House of Commons Debates 700 (Dec. 8, 1953).
51. Id.
52. [1956] 7 House of Commons Debates 6955 (Aug. 3, 1956).
53. A. Donat Pharand, Dep't of Political Science, University of Ottawa.
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able indicating the Canadian position"a4 even after Prime Minister
Diefenbaker had implicitly repudiated it by stating that it was his administration's policy to do everything possible "to assure that our
[Canadian] sovereignty to the North Pole be asserted and continually
asserted, by Canada." 55 Professor Pharand's interpretation would seem
to reflect a confused perspective on the claim-making of states. He seems
to have regarded Canada's spokesmen as formulaters of law rather than
as advocates of national welfare. How else could he have judged the
Lesage formulation as a "more accurate" picture of Canada's claims than
the picture presented by prior and subsequent claims by Canadian heads.
of-state? The distinction at issue is a crucial one, not only for the observei
of legal diplomacy but also for the judge of international law, for 11
state's legal rights sometimes turn on determinations of what it has
claimed in the past. 56 This is particularly true when issues of historic
rights are involved.
Although the government showed great reluctance to make any unequivocal claim of sovereignty over the Arctic waters for several months
after the Manhattan's conquest, such a claim was made by Minister of
External Affairs Mitchell Sharp on February 19, 1970. Referring to all
the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago, Mr. Sharp declared,
"These are our waters. There has never been any question of that. We
have always regarded them as our waters." 57 It would appear that historic right is at the basis of this claim and that Canada may eventually
make a case for historic right, even though this case has not yet been
articulated by Canadian authorities.
From Canadian maps and statement of various heads-of-state as well
as from Canadian practice in the waters of the archipelgo, it may be
found that Canada has made a sufficiently well-defined "claim" of
jurisdiction over the waters as her Arctic archipelago. This issue, however, is subject to debate.
In considering whether the claim has been "consistently applied," we
must consider the implications of the Lesage deviation discussed above.
The World Court seems to have ruled on this point in a manner favorable to Canada. The relevant passage from the decision reads as follows:
The Court considers that too much importance need not be attached
to the few uncertainties or contradictions, real or apparent, which the

54. Pharand, supra note 2, at 53.
55. [1958] 4 House of Commons Debates 3652 (Aug. 16, 1958).
56. On this point, the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case, supra
note 34, at 132 observed: "Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily
a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the
validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international
law."
57. The Globe and Mail, Feb. 20, 1970, at I, col. 6.
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United Kingdom Government claims to have discovered in Norwegian
practice. They may be easily understood in the light of the variety of
the facts and conditions prevailing in the long period ....58
It would thus appear that the Court would not place great weight on
one deviation from traditional state policy in its application of the historic right doctrine. Indeed, it would be a strange brand of international
law which would allow one statement by one cabinet member to doom
the policy of a state asserted over long periods of time and clarified by
heads-of-state subsequent to the deviation. The Lesage deviation, therefore, would probably not be a sufficient one to forfeit Canadian claims
of historic right if the other criteria are met.
Finally, the test of "no opposition" or "general toleration" must be
considered. Opposition now,59 if it has not been expressed earlier - as
apparently it has not 59A - would probably be regarded as too late. In the
opinion of the Court, "general toleration" over a long period would serve
as "the basis of an historical consolidation which would make it enforceable as against all States." 60
In summary, it would appear that Canada may be able to achieve
legitimation of her claimed jurisdiction over the frozen waters of her
archipelago under the doctrine of historic right either by meeting the
tests of the Norwegian Fisheries decision in a judical or arbitral proceeding or by receiving a gradual acknowledgment by the world community of states of the validity of Canadian historical practice and claims
in conferring territorial jurisdiction to Canada. However, Canada's case
for legitimation might alternatively be made under the standards of contemporary conventional law, apart from the tests of historic right.
C. LEGITIMATION VIA INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION

The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone 6' provides for the drawing of straight baselines along certain coastal
archipelagos to be used for measuring the territorial sea outward from
them and enclosing the waters within them as internal waters. Article 4
of the Convention provides as follows:
1. [I]f there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate
vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points
may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured.
58. Supra note 34, at 138.
59. Recently voiced opposition by the United States to regarding the Northwest

Passage as anything but high seas is discussed in § III, D, inIra.
59A. See note 48 supra.

60. Supra note 34, at 138.
61. Note 25 supra.
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2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying
within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.
In order to establish a right to draw baselines which would enclose
the waters of her Arctic archipelago, Canada would have to argue that
the islands form a "fringe .. .along the coast" which lay in the coast's
"immediate vicinity," that the baselines would follow the "general direction of the coast," and that there are sufficient links between the sea and
land areas to justify the "internalizing" of the waters. While Canada's
case for the southern tier of islands forming a fringe in the immediate
vicinity of the coast might prove persuasive, there can be serious dispute
over whether the northern tier - those islands above the Parry Channel is part of a fringe in the coast's immediate vicinity.0 2 The islands of the
southern tier are less than twenty-four miles from the coast or from each
other, but the islands of the northern tier are, for the most part, more
than twenty-four miles from the southern tier. 3 It may be significant
that they are separated not only by distance but by the main channel of
the Northwest Passage as well. Thus, it would be unlikely that an international tribunal would find both island groups as meeting the "fringe
in the immediate vicinity" test. The southern tier may well meet the
test, but the northern tier would probably be held not to meet it.
The second test which the Canadian archipelago would have to meet
requires that its outer perimeter follow the "general direction of the
coast." While there may be a "unitary appearance" 64 of the whole
archipelago with the mainland, a close look at a globe or map will reveal that the southern tier of islands alone follows the "general direction"
of the coast more closely than do the two tiers together. A general survey of directions seems to be the test suggested by paragraph 2 of Article
4 of the Convention.
The paragraph includes a second test, namely that the sea areas be
"closely linked" to the land area. 'Canada has a case suggesting compliance with this test on the basis of her historically exclusive exercise of
jurisdiction over the entire archipelago area. The government has provided welfare, postal, and meteorological services to the 10,000 Eskimos
of the archipelago, seventy-five per cent of whom were reported in 1964
to be living almost exclusively upon fish and mammals of the northern
64
waters and ice for food and clothing. A
62. The fact that the Canadian Arctic archipelago is "dividcd into two principal
parts" was noted by Pharand, supra note 2, at 48, but not in the context of legal
distinctions.
63. For a description of these island groups, see Pharand, id.
64. This "unitary appearance of the formation" was commented upon by Head,
supra note 27, at 218.
64A. HARRIS, CANADIAN POCKET ENCYCLOPEDIA 56 (1963-64).
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It would appear that Canada can make a case for baselines enclosing
the waters of her Arctic archipelago under Article 4 of the Territorial
Sea Convention. Her case might well be a convincing one, at least in regard to the southern tier of her Arctic islands - those below the Parry
Channel. The prospects for such baselines being extendable to the
northern tier appear much less favorable.
To date, Canada has not drawn baselines around the waters of the
Arctic archipelago, although there is domestic legislation providing for
them, because, in the words of External Affairs Minister Sharp, "To do
so in some areas would be to take an action that might compromise the
position of the Canadian government, in future declarations." 65
One such "future declaration" which might thereby be prejudiced is
a claim of sovereignty over all the waters of the Arctic archipelago by
virtue of historic right - a claim which wins legitimation not from a
contemporary drawing of baselines, but rather from historic practice.
D.

DOMESTIC LEGISLATION -

NON-LEGAL STRATEGY TO

AFFECT LEGAL RIGHTS

Although the historic right doctrine and Article 4 of the Territorial
Sea Convention provide the most probable potential bases for recognition
of Canada's claims of sovereignty over all or a part of the Arctic waters
of the Canadian archipelago, neither case has been fully elaborated or
formally advanced by Canada. In fact, the Canadian government most
recently has acted "to guard against any possible litigation" 66 of issues
which might affect the status of Canada's claims of Arctic sovereignty
and authority to set shipping standards to apply even beyond the archipelago.
On April 7, 1970, Canada's Ambasador to the United Nations, Yvon
Beaulne, presented Secretary General U Thant with a letter partially
withdrawing Canadian recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. The scope of this withdrawal of recognition covers:
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction of rights claimed
or exercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or
exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the preenvention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine
67
vironment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.

65. Supra note 4, at 3625 (Feb. 16, 1970).. The enabling legislation is the Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act, 1-2 Eliz. II, S.C. 1952-53, c. 15, § 2 (b).
66. Statement by Prime Minister Trudeau, 114 House of Commons Debates, No. 97,
2nd Sess., 28th Parl., at 5623 (April 8, 1970).
67. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1970, at 12, col. 1.
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This new reservation to Canada's willingness to be brought before
the World Court was timed to coincide with the introduction in the
House of Commons of two bills "dealing with protection of Canada's
marine environment and the living resources of the sea." 68 Canada has
rejected international litigation of her claims and instead has chosen
a course of domestic legislation to advance her Arctic claims while indicating the need for new formulations of international law.
The first of the two bills is a proposed amendment of the 1964 Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act to provide for a twelve mile territorial
sea limit in place of the three mile rule presently contained in the Act.63'
If successful, the legislation would constitute a Parliamentary act of
diplomacy in the assertion of twelve mile territorial sea limits and would
provide the necessary basis for general recognition of Canadian sovereign
rights over twelve miles of coastal seas3 0 If the twelve mile limit comes
to govern, it will be impossible for ships to navigate the Northwest Passage without traversing Canadian territorial waters. 71 This would not,
however, allow Canada to prevent innocent passage. 72 The 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea defines innocent passage to include
any passage "not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal State." 73 Canada may, however, argue at some point that the passage of ships, such as by the oil-tanker, Manhattan, does not meet the
test of innocent passage unless Canadian standards of safety are met.
Rigid safety requirements for all ships passing through any waters
of the Canadian Arctic archipelago or within 100 nautical miles of them
are provided for in the second bill placed before the House of Commons.7 4 Fines of $100,000, seizure, and forfeiture of both ship and cargo
are provided for violaters of those requirements. By winning international acceptance of these measures, Canada may establish her sovereignty
in an indirect or de facto way.
In explaining Canada's unwillingness to litigate the jurisdictional
issues raised by the bills, Prime Minister Trudeau stated:
68. Debates, supra note 66, at 5624.
69. Bill C-203, introduced and given first reading in the House of Commons. Debates, supra note 66, at 5626.
70. The World Court commented in the Fisheries case that "[t]he delimitation of
sea areas has always an international aspect. ... it is true that the act of delimitation
is necessarily a unilateral act. .."Supra note 34, at 132.
71. A ship passing through the Parry Channel could not navigate the Barrow Strait
without coming within 12 miles of one of the following islands: Bathurst, Garrett,
Lowther, Young, or Russell. It would also have to pass within three miles of Banks,
Princess Royal, or Victorial Island at the western end of the Passage unless the more
northerly M'Clure Strait, which is more exposed to blocking by older and harder
Arctic ice from the permanent polar ice cap, is chosen.
72. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 25, art. 15.
73. Id., art. 14, para. 6.
74. Bill C-202, introduced and given first reading in the House of Commons, Debates, supra note 66, at 5626.
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It is well known that there is little or no environmental law on the
international plane and that the law now in existence favours the interests of the shipping states and the shipping owners engaged in the
large scale carriage of oil and other potential pollutants. 75
Despite (Canada's efforts to avoid litigation, some form of international
proceeding may ultimately determine the limits of Canadian authority
over the waters of its Arctic archipelago, for the United States was quick
and firm in registering its dissent from the Canadian claims inherent in
the proposed legislation:
International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdictions on the high seas, and the United States can
neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction.
...[M]erchant shipping would be severely restricted, and naval mobility would be seriously jeopardized. The potential for serious interna76
tional dispute and conflict is obvious.
The United States implored Canada not to effectuate the proposed
legislation, but rather to cooperate in a search for internationally agreed
solutions. If the Canadian government is not willing to delay action on
the bills, the United States has suggested that U.S.-Canadian "differences"
77
be submitted to the International Court of Justice.
The recent Brussels Conference produced two conventions dealing with
controls of marine pollution and compensation for damages, but it did
not go far enough to relieve Canadian concern for the safety of her
Arctic North. 78 The Canadian government has now proceeded to act
on its own authority to control the threat of pollution from Northwest
Passage voyages. The Prime Minister has declared, "[S]omebody has to
preserve this area for mankind until international law develops, and we
79
are prepared to help it by taking steps on our own.

Whether the Canadian proposals for extended domestic legislation will
be followed by other states' unilateral claims as were the Truman Proclamations of 1945 or by a new international conference to more fully resolve the problems of maritime pollution and coastal state jurisdiction is
not yet clear. Canada's response in legal diplomacy to the Manhattan's
conquest and to the potential threat of pollution of the Canadian Arctic
has joined the social-political-legal issues between the competing interests
of protection of coastal states from the dangers of marine pollution and
the preservation of the freedom of passage on the high seas for all states.

75. Supra note 66, at 5624.
76. Press Release of Department of State on Canada's Claim to Jurisdiction Over
Arctic Pollution and Territorial Sea Limits, April 15, 1970.
77. Id.
78. For a comprehensive discussion of the accomplishments and limitations of the
Brussels Conference, see Note, Reflections on Brussels: IMCO and the 1969 Pollution
Conventions, in this issue of the JouRNAL at
79. Montreal Star, April 9, 1970 at 1, col. 1.
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The questions of how much authority the archipelago state may exercise in inter-island waters and how much extra-territorial authority the
coastal state may exercise to protect its territorial seas and coasts from
contamination are not strictly legal questions. They are questions which
legal diplomacy as well as law will have to resolve. They will be resolved
in the context of conflicting interests competing through the medium of
existing principles and newly-formulated proposals of international law.

